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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Robert Norman, SrM & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Case No. 20010134 - SC
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
Oral Argument Priority

Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson.
Defendants - Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from final judgments in a civil case by summary judgments pursuant to
Rule 56, U.RCiv.P. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
U.CA. §78-2-2(3)0).
ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The final judgment in this case is based on three summary judgments granted in
defendants' favor.

First the trial court granted defendant Arnold summary judgment on

plaintiffs' claim based on breach of fiduciary duty and for punitive damages. Second, the trial
court granted defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim for violation of a joint venture
agreement. Third, the trial court granted defendants summary judgment of plaintiffs' claim for
liability under a trust deed note.

1

In plaintiffs' Docketing Statement, the Statement of Issues Presented included numerous
subpoints for each of the three rulings For purposes of this brief, the issues presented may be
summarized as follows
1

Did the trial court err in granting defendant Arnold's motion for summary

judgment on plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim (R779, Add 7) Specifically, did the
trial court err in ruling, as a matter of law, that under no circumstances can an attorney for a
small joint venture owe afiduciaryduty to any of its individual members The trial court made
no factual findings regarding this ruling The standard of review for issues of law on summary
judgment is that of correctness, with no deference accorded to the tnal court Moreover, this
court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs' (Normans) position
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P 2d 1283 (Utah Ct App 1996), Breuer-Harnson v.
Combe, 799 P 2d 716, 723 (Utah Ct App 1990)

This ruling was not final when entered

because it did not dispose of the entire case It became final when defendants were granted
summary judgment on all counts Plaintiffs objected to the Order granting summary judgment
when entered (R 776, Add 8)
2

Did the tnal court err in granting both defendants' motions for summary judgment

on plaintiffs'claim for breach of the joint venture agreement (R 1415, Add 34) In this instance
the tnal court ruled that defendants could not be found to have violated a joint venture agreement
because they were not partners in the venture The issue more specifically then is, did the tnal
court en in ruling, as a matter of law, that under no circumstances could the defendants become
partners in a joint venture without the express consent of all other partners including the
plaintiffs The tnal court made no factual findings regarding this ruling The standard of review
for issues of law on summary judgment is that of conectness, with no deference accorded to the

2

trial court. Id. Plaintiffs objected to the Order granting summary judgment on this issue.
(R. 1405, Add. 33)
3.

Did the trial court err in granting both defendants' motion for summary judgment

on plaintiffs' claim for liability under a trust deed note. (R.1415, Add. 34) The plaintiffs solely
incurred the loss under the note by selling the subject property to the holder of the note and
deducting the $212,000 balance of the note from the sale price. Defendant Arnold had purchased
the interest of a co-obligor in the joint venture and specifically indemnified that person against
liability under the note. Defendant Larson was a co-obligor on the note. The more specific issue
therefore is, did the Court err in ruling, as a matter of law, that the defendants were not liable
under the note for contribution or otherwise. The trial court made no formal factual findings
regarding this ruling. The standard of review for issues of law on summary judgment is that of
correctness, with no deference accorded to the trial court. Id. Plaintiffs objected to the Order
granting summary judgment on this issue. (R. 1405, Add. 33)
4.

Did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages on

summary judgment, and in refusing to reinstate the claim on plaintiffs' later motion.
Specifically, did the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, though couched in terms of breach of
contract, also raise issues sounding in tort that would support a claim for punitive damages. The
standard of review for this ruling is correctness. Id.
Plaintiffs objected to the Order granting summary judgment on this issue. (R.776, Add. 8)
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to reinstate the punitive damages claim. (R.765, Add. 9)
The trial court Order denied the Motion (R.1145, Add. 23). Plaintiffs objected to the Order.
(R. 1046, Add. 20)
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5.

Did the trial court err in refusing to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel

against the defendants to prohibit them from denying that they had become partners in a joint
venture to develop a hotel on plaintiffs' property. This would lypically be a mixed question of
law and fact, but again the trial court made no factual findings, and in this case, no legal findings.
However, since it may be framed in purely legal terms, this Court should review the constructive
ruling for correctness. Id.
There was not a formal motion to apply equitable estoppel per se. With regard to each of
the causes of action the plaintiffs argued that defendants should be estopped, i.e. from denying an
attorney-client relationship, from denying participation in the joint venture and from denying
liability as co-obligors under the Trust Deed Note. In denying plaintiffs' Motions and granting
the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Court effectively refused to apply the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. (See, summary judgment papers and hearing transcripts in
plaintiffs' Addendum.)
6.

Did the trial court err in refusing to allow plaintiffs' to amend their Complaint in

order, among other things, to name the joint venture as a party plaintiff, to name defendant
Larson's corporate entity, Western Empire Advisors as a defendant, and to assert a claim for
contribution under the trust deed note. This issue should be reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. Rule 15, U.RCiv.P.
Plaintiffs filed Motions to file a 2nd Amended Complaint and a further amendment.
(R.971, Add. 13 and R.1019, Add. 16) The trial court denied the motions. (R.1036, Add. 19 and
R.1136, Add. 21) Plaintiffs objected to the Order denying the motion to amend. (R.1046, Add.
20)
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party is entitled to

summary judgment only upon a finding that there are no material facts in dispute, and the party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court made no factual findings, and virtually
every material fact is in dispute. As will be demonstrated below, the trial court's rulings that
defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law were incorrect.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Plaintiffs' Complaint

containing causes of action for (I) Breach of a Joint Venture Agreement; (II) Liability Under a
Trust Deed Note; and (III) Punitive Damages; was filed on September 18, 1998. (R.l,
Addendum 1 ("Add.")) A Default Judgment was enter ^d against defendant Arnold on October
19, 1998. (R.50) The default was subsequently set aside on defendant's Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
(Ruling dated 11-12-98, R.102). After some discovery, plaintiffs requested and were granted
leave to file an amended complaint adding a cause of action against defendant Arnold for breach
of fiduciary duty in his capacity as an attorney. (1st Amended Complaint filed 11-9-99, R.21652, Add. 2)
Arnold thereafter sought partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims for: (I) Breach
of Joint Venture Agreement; (III) Breachof Fiduciary Duty; and (IV) Punitive Damages. The
Court denied the motion as to Count I, and granted as to Counts III & IV. (Transcript of 8-2-00
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Hearing, R.1429, Add. 35; Ruling dated 8-15-00, R.779, Add. 7; Plaintiffs objection to the
ruling dated 10-15-00, R.776, Add. 8)
A jury trial was set for August 28, 2000. The trial proceeded through jury selection, but a
mistrial was declared due to juror misconduct. (Minutes of Mistrial, R.962, Add. 12) The Court
thereafter heard argument on various motions in limine raised by the plaintiffs and defendant
Arnold. Id. The trial court's rulings dramatically affected plaintiffs' case and the evidence
available to them.

(Transcript of 8-28-00 proceedings, R.1432, Add. 36; Orders were

subsequently filed on 11-8-00, R.1139, Add. 22 & R.1145, Add. 23) Plaintiffs sought leave to
file a 2nd Amended Complaint (R.971-77, Add. 13), and for leave to "further amend." (R.101925, Add. 16) On October 10, 2000, after hearing argument on the Motions to Amend, the trial
court held a conference in chambers wherein he invited all parties to submit Motions for
Summary Judgment so the case could be "wrapped up in one appeal." The trial court then
denied plaintiffs' Motions to Amend.

(Minutes of 10-10-00 Hearing, R.1036, Add. 19;

Transcript of 10-10-00 Hearing, R. 1430, Add. 37)
All parties thereafter filed motions for summary judgment on the remaining issues.
(Larson's Motion dated 11-7-00, R. 1048-64, Add. 24; Plaintiffs' response dated 11-15-00,
R.1148-61, Add. 25; Plaintiffs' Motion dated 11-30-00, R.1186-1197, Add. 27; Larson's Reply
Memo dated 12-4-00, R. 1242-52, Add. 28; Larson's response to plaintiffs' motion, dated 12-1300, R.1276-85, Add.29; Arnold's Motion dated 12-13-00 at R.1304-15, 1387-93, Add. 30; and
Arnold's response to plaintiffs' motion dated 12-14-00 at R. 1394-1403, Add. 31) The trial court
granted defendants' motions and denied plaintiffs' motions. (Transcript of 12-15-00 Hearing,
R.1431, Add. 38; Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment dated 1-18-01, R.1415-17,
Add. 34; Plaintiffs' objections to the ruling dated 1-8-01, R. 1405-14, Add. 33)
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C.

Statement of Facts

In granting defendants' various motions for summary judgment, the Court made no
factual findings. Consequently, viewing the record in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the
allegations set forth in Normans' Amended Complaint are assumed to be true unless
conclusively refuted in the record. The allegations of plaintiffs Amended Complaint (R.216,
Add. 2), are therefore incorporated by reference herein.
An extensive factual record was established in the parties' various motions for and
responses to motions for summary judgment. It includes a great deal of testimony from the
parties' depositions and copy after copy of the critical documents. Rather than reproduce all that
here, it will be included in the Addendum with appropriate references throughout the brief.
A great deal of the relevant factual information is duplicated many times. All of it will be
included in plaintiffs' request for transmission of the record on appeal. All of the parties'
memoranda and relevant exhibits will be included in plaintiffs' addendum. The depositions of
the parties were never submitted for the record. However, the important aspects of the testimony
are included in the parties' memoranda. Transcripts of the important hearings before the trial
court have been transcribed and will be included in plaintiffs' addendum.
Additional Facts
1.

In his Answer to plaintiffs' Complaint dated October 23, 1998 (R.73-80), and his

Answer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, dated December 10, 1999 (R.277-283), the
latter of which was filed after the plaintiffs were deposed, defendant Arnold asserted as his 13th
affirmative defense that:
As a further and separate defense, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs' claims are
barred or unenforceable, in whole or in part, by reason that the Defendant had a license,
either express or implied, to perform the acts complained of by Plaintiffs, (emphasis
added)
7

2.

In his Answer to plaintiffs' Complaint, Id, and his Answer to Plaintiffs' First

Amended Complaint, Id., the latter of which was filed after the plaintiffs were deposed,
defendant Arnold asserted as his 14th affirmative defense that:
As a further and separate defense, Defendant alleges that plaintiffs' claims are
barred or unenforceable, in whole or in part, by reason of plaintiffs' consent to the terms
and conditions of which they complain, (emphasis added)
3.

In denying defendant Arnold's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

plaintiffs' first cause of action for breach of a joint venture agreement, the Court ruled:
The motion for partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs 'first cause of
action for breach of joint venture agreement is denied because there are disputes issues
of fact concerning whether plaintiffs consented, through their conduct, to admit Arnold as
a partner to the joint venture. The court will fashion a jury instruction that a finding of
such consent is a prerequisite to establishing Arnold's liability, if any, on the first cause
of action. (Ruling of 10-15-00, R.779, Add. 7)
Following this ruling, the plaintiffs' claim and the facts related to it remained the same
and there was no further discovery. However, the Court subsequently granted defendants'
renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on the same issue. (Ruling dated 1-18-01, R.1415,
Add. 34)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I:

The Summary Judgment Granted to Defendant Arnold on Plaintiffs' Claims For

Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Punitive Damages Was Error
The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that defendant-attorney Arnold did now owe the
plaintiffs a fiduciary ^aty solely because the plaintiffs did not directly and expressly hire Arnold
as their personal attorney. The ruling is contrary to this Court's decision in Margulies v.
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), which held that where the individual interests of partners
in a joint venture are directly involved there may be sufficient grounds for implying the existence
of an attorney-client relationship.

Defendant Arnold could not even identify the entity he

purported to represent and stated that he view them as individuals. Moreover, it was undisputed
that plaintiffs had substantial personal interests involved in the venture and that they looked to
Arnold to protect their personal interests. Summary Judgment on this issue was therefore
inappropriate.
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' punitive damage claim solely on the basis of
dismissing the fiduciary duty claim.
Point II:

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Defendants' Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs'

Claim For Violations of the Joint Venture Agreement
Defendants Arnold and Larson controlled the assets, funds and activities of a joint
venture that was attempting to build a Holiday Inn on property in Moab, Utah owned by the
plaintiffs. Defendants conducted themselves as members of the venture at all times for the
purpose of acquiring an equity interest in the project. Defendants subsequently acquired an
interest in the venture and held themselves out publicly as partners. Defendants' conduct
9

directly caused the dissolution of the "Moab Land Development Joint Venture" and the ultimate
failure of the project. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claim for breach of the joint venture
agreement solely on the basis that the plaintiffs did not expressly consent that Arnold and Larson
become partners. The trial court's final ruling is contrary to a mountain of evidence and its own
previous ruling that a jury could find the defendants were partners in the joint venture through
their conduct and the plaintiffs' knowing acquiescence. Summary Judgment was inappropriate.
Point HI:

The Defendants Should Be Held Responsible For a Proportionate Share of the

Liability Under the Young Trust Deed Note,
At the outset of the joint venture defendant Arnold secured a $160,000 loan from his
client Ann Young. Defendant Larson was a co-obligor with the plaintiffs and others on the note.
When defendant Arnold bought into the venture he specifically assumed the liability of the
departing member under the note. The note was never repaid. Since the note was secured by
plaintiffs' property, the Normans were forced to sell the property to the holder of the note to
purchase the property with the entire balance ($212,000) deducted from the purchase price.
Plaintiffs claimed that defendants should have to pay their fair share of the loss. The trial court
dismissed the claim, ruling that the defendants' liability ran to the maker of the note and the
former partner, not the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs request that defendants be estopped from denying
liability under the note was denied. Plaintiffs claim that the dismissal of the claim is contrary to
law and equity.
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Point FV.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claim For Punitive Damages.

The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages based on the finding that,
after the dismissal of the Arnold fiduciary duty claim, plaintiffs' remaining causes of action were
contractual. The allegations of plaintiffs' complaint sound in tort as well as contract, and
defendants' conduct in breaching their express or implied contracts with plaintiffs was tortious.
Summary Judgment on that basis was therefore improper.
Point V:

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Not Allowing the Plaintiffs to Amend

Their Complaint
The plaintiffs

demonstrated that defendants

had intentionally withheld and

misrepresented information critical to plaintiffs' claims until after the litigation was filed.
Defendants' legal defenses (i.e., we can't be held liable as partners because we bought into the
venture secretly and dishonestly) should have been prohibited due to their conduct. When the
trial court allowed the defenses, plaintiffs repeatedly requested leave to amend their pleadings
accordingly.

On other matters, i.e., adding defendant Larson's corporate alter ego as a

defendant, the trial court should have exercised its discretion to allow the innocent parties'
claims to go forward. Instead, the trial court denied the motions and dismissed plaintiffs' claims.

11

ARGUMENT
Point I: The Summary Judgment Granted to Defendant Arnold
on Plaintiffs' Claims For Breach of Fiduciary Duty and
Punitive Damages Was Error,
In their third cause of action, plaintiffs claimed that defendant Arnold breached his
fiduciary duties as counsel to the joint venture resulting in personal losses to the plaintiffs in
excess of $200,000. It is undisputed that Arnold acted as counsel for the joint venture.
(Affidavit of Mark Arnold, R.364, ^[6, Add. 3) The Normans claim that, in that capacity,
Arnold's fiduciary duties also ran directly to them.
The trial court granted Arnold's motion for summary judgment solely on the basis that
the plaintiffs did not specifically hire Arnold as their personal attorney, even though Arnold
claimed as an affirmative defense that he had a license, either express or implied, to perform the
acts plaintiffs' complain of. (See, Additional Fact #1, above) The facts of the case clearly create
a fiduciary duty running from Arnold to the Normans. The trial court's ruling, as a matter of
law, that under no circumstances does the representation of a small joint venture give rise to
fiduciary duties to the individual members is incorrect.
A.

The Facts Related to this Cause of Action
1.

The initial members of the joint venture formed to develop a hotel on property

owned by the plaintiffs were Robert & Diane Norman, Duane Barney, Eric Rasmussen (Greg
Page) and Peter Lanto. (R.12-18; Addendum 1)
2.

A document called the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement was

executed by these parties in March, 1995. The joint venture called for the Normans to provide
real property in Moab, Utah and the others "expertise and consideration." Specifically, Barney

12

would be manager/administrator, Page would be in charge of financial matters and Lanto would
be in charge of construction. Id.
3.

Members Barney, Page and Lanto comprised a separate entity known as 4-D

Development, that was simultaneously working on a separate hotel project in Park City, Utah
that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of or interest in. (Affidavit of Robert Norman, f 5, R. 1167,
Add. 26)
4.

In April, 1995, 4-D Development, entered a Service Agreement with defendant

Larson whereby Larson was to obtain financing for both the Moab and Park City projects in
exchange for a 25% equity position. Greg Page gave Larson a $5,000 advance for costs.
(R.525-28; Add. 4)
5.

Defendant Arnold was retained as attorney for the joint venture(s) or "group" on

both hotel projects. (Larson deposition at 17, 27, R.500, Add. 4)

There is no written fee or

retainer agreement. Arnold was not even aware if a separate legal entity existed. In his
deposition, defendant Arnold could not even articulate what the "group" was. He view them as
individuals. ("I think in my mind I was acting as an attorney . . . for Greg Page, Duane Barney
and the Normans." (Arnold deposition at 14-15, R.513) "I represented them all individually as a
group." (Id. at 29-30); "I don't know what that group was. I viewed them as individuals." {Id.
at 38-39, R.513-14, 609-10) Arnold, at one time, actually admitted representing the Normans
individually. Id. at 169, R.515, Add. 4)
6.

At all relevant times, defendant Arnold was also the attorney of defendant Larson

and his corporate entity Western Empire Advisors. (Larson deposition at 27, 44, 47-48, 111-12,
R.500-01,505,Add.4)
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7.

Defendant Larson with Arnold's assistance, obtained a Holiday Inn Franchise for

the Moab project. (R.532-535; Add. 4)
8.

The Moab venture needed money to pay Larson for the franchise and for seed

capital to attract financing.

On or about June 16, 1995, Arnold went to his clients Ann and

Norman Young and obtained a loan for $160,000. The terms of the note were 90 days at 18%
interest, with 12 points. (Affidavit of Mark Arnold, R.364, f7, Add. 3)
9.

Arnold immediately transferred the loan proceeds to his client Norman Larson

who deposited the money in his own bank account. {Id f 8)
10.

On June 19, 1995, defendant Larson reimbursed himself $40,000 for the Holiday

Inn Franchise. Larson did not transfer the franchise to the joint venture, but rather kept it in his
own name. (R.532, 535; Larson deposition at 101-103, R.505, Add. 4)
11.

On June 20, 1995, Arnold was paid $8,000 for "loan fees," Larson was paid

$8,000 for "loan fees," and Arnold's clients were paid $3,200 for "points." (Larson Deposition
at 54, 64, R.501, 503; R.538-540, Add. 4)
12.

These payments were made despite the fact that Arnold and Larson had done

virtually no work to secure the loan. The terms of the loan were described as "criminal" both by
Joe Kingsley, an expert in financial transactions in the Moab area who was deposed by Arnold's
counsel, and by Jim Winkler, another client of Arnold who eventually purchased the Youngs'
interest in the note. Winkler, in fact, refused to enforce the provision for 18% interest and
instead charged the Normans 10%.
13.

On June 19, 1995, defendants Arnold and Larson alone formed Venture

Properties II, L.C., the existence of which they denied under oath until the plaintiffs obtained
their corporate filing, and the purpose for which they have never explained. (R.536-537, Add. 4)
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14.

On June 21, 1995, defendant Larson wrote a check for $10,000 out of the Young

loan proceeds as earnest money for the purchase of property for the Park City hotel project.
(R.541, Add. 4) The purchase did not take place. Pursuant to a letter from Arnold the $10,000
earnest money check was returned to Venture Properties II, L.C. The check was endorsed by
both Larson and Arnold and given to Larson for deposit. The $10,000 was subsequently not
accounted for in the Moab joint venture funds. (R. 542-544, Add. 4)
15.

Mark Arnold was the attorney for the Park City project and land acquisition

effort. (Larson deposition at 73-74, R.504; R.542-544, Addendum 4)
16.

On or about June 27, 1995, after the loan was acquired and all the foregoing

expenditures made, Page and Barney traveled to Moab. They told the Normans $40,000 was
needed to obtain the Holiday Inn and asked the Normans to pledge their property as collateral for
a loan in that amount. The Normans signed a Trust Deed and a note in the amount of $40,000.
These documents had been prepared by defendant Arnold's title company at his direction.
(R.561-62; Deposition of Diane Norman, 75-76,104, R.506; Add. 4)
17.

Defendant Larson, who had sole control and check signing authority over the

Young loan proceeds, testified that he sought approval and authorization for the foregoing
expenditures and all expenditures from the joint venture funds from his attorney and attorney for
the joint venture(s) Mark Arnold. (Larson deposition, 54-58, 63-64, R.502-03, Add. 4)
18.

When the Normans received copies of the fully executed documents, the amount

of the note had been changed to $160,000. The Normans were informed that additional money
was needed as "seed capital" to obtain financing. (Deposition of Diane Norman at 75-76, R.506,
Add. 4)
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19.

Prior to and following these events defendant Larson, with Arnold acting as

attorney engaged in efforts to obtain construction and other financing for both the Moab and
Park City projects. (See, e.g., R.529-31, 545-47, 555: Add. 4)
20.

Pursuant to those efforts, on or about September 29, 1995, Larson with Arnold's

approval wired $50,000 to Trust Guarantee Corp. in Arizona. (R.545, Add. 4)
21.

On October 27, 1995, Mark Arnold negotiated and executed the purchase of "any

and all interest" of Peter Lanto in the Moab and Park City projects. The named purchasers were
Arnold and Larson's corporate entity Western Empire Advisors. The $8,500 price was paid to
Lanto out of the Young loan proceeds, "in lieu of attorney's fees" to Mark Arnold. (Larson
deposition at 7, 84-87, 90, R.503-504; R.548-551, Add. 4)
22.
Development.

Simultaneous with the purchase of Lanto's interest, Greg Page dissolved 4-D
This event also necessarily resulted in the dissolution of the Moab Land

Development Joint Venture. (R.550, Add. 4)
23.

Nevertheless, defendants Arnold and Larson thereafter held themselves out

publicly, in writing, and among the "group" members as partners with an equity interest in the
projects. In addition, Arnold continued to hold himself out as attorney for the projects. (See,
e.g., R.555, 559, 561-64, 571-72; Add. 4) Even more, Arnold had ascended to the position of
"spokesman" for the joint venture. (Larson deposition at 111-112, R.505, Add. 4)
24.

Other than an awareness that Arnold was acting as counsel for the "group" and

Larson had something to do with trying to arrange financing, and that Arnold and Larson had
become partners in the joint venture, the plaintiffs were not informed and did not agree to any of
the events set forth above. (Affidavit of Robert Norman, R. 1167-81, Add. 26)
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25.

These arrangements and transactions undertaken by defendants Arnold and

Larson were in direct violation of the provisions of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture
that the professional defendants were supposedly working for, and (assuming it ever existed at
all in fact) resulted in its dissolution not later than October 27,1995. {Id. f9)
26.

As of the time the Young note initially came due on September 27, 1995,

defendants Arnold and Larson had made no payments of principal or interest. Eventually, some
interest payments were made by Larson, but the note was in continuous default at 18% interest.
(R.557,Add. 4)
27.

At the insistence of the Normans, Arnold obtained two extensions on the note

from his clients, the Youngs. (Affidavit of Mark Arnold, ^|9, R.364, Add. 3)
28.

The defendants were unsuccessful in obtaining financing for the project. The

$50,000 Arnold and Larson sent to Arizona was lost and never recovered. (Larson deposition at
27, 36-37, R.500, Add. 4)
29.

The "group" including Arnold as a partner, made written demand on defendant

Larson for the return of the Young loan proceeds, plus interest. Larson paid nothing. (R. 5 59-60,
Add. 4)
30.

However, in February, 1996, Larson paid Greg Page the $5,000 he had been

provided for costs under the Service Agreement. Larson took the money out of the Young
proceeds. (R.556-557, Add. 4)
31.

When the Youngs subsequently threatened foreclosure, Arnold arranged to have

the note purchased by another client, Jim Winkler. (Affidavit of Mark Arnold, ^9-10; R.364,
Add. 3)
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32.

By mid-1996, everyone involved abandoned the project, leaving the Normans

with an unpaid 18% note against their property. Having lost their ability to pay the note as well
as their ability to control their own valuable property, the Normans were forced to sell the
subject property to Jim Winkler in August, 1998. The sale price was reduced by the $212,000
balance on the outstanding note. (R.568-69, Add. 4)
B.

The Facts of this Case Support the Claim that Defendant Arnold Had Fiduciary Duties
Directly to the Plaintiffs.
It is undisputed that Arnold was attorney for all the various individuals, groups and joint

ventures disclosed by foregoing fact statement. By his own testimony, defendant Arnold viewed
the "group" as individuals. This is probably because Arnold and his client Larson never acted as
if the "Moab Land Development Joint Venture" had any separate existence in fact. Arnold and
Larson were simultaneously working on a competing project unknown to the Normans and
prohibited by the Moab joint venture agreement. Larson and Arnold assumed positions of
authority and used funds secured by the Normans' property on other projects in violation of the
joint venture agreement. Indeed, Arnold and Larson behaved as if the money were their own,
and used it for their personal enrichment and benefit. Eventually, Larson and Arnold directly
caused the dissolution of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture, and thereafter held
themselves out as partners and completely took over control of the business of whatever
venture(s) continued to exist.
It is undisputed that the Normans never personally requested that Mark Arnold act as
their private attorney. On that basis alone, the trial court ruled that Arnold's duties were to the
joint venture or group, and that he had no fiduciary duty to the Normans as a matter of law.
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However, he trial court's ruling is directly contradicted by the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in Marguhes v. UpchurcK 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985). (The trial court was
unfamiliar with the Marguhes case as of the time of oral arguments, and granted defendant's
motion without reading it. (Transcript of 8-2-00 Hearing, R. 1429 at 25, Add. 35)
In Marguhes the Salt Lake firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough ("J-W")
represented a limited partnership comprised of physicians.

Subsequently the firm became

involved in a malpractice case that included several of the individual limited partners as
defendants, as well as a case in federal court where J-W represented the limited partnership. J-W
disclosed the potential conflict of interest both to the general partner of the limited partnership
and to the named limited partner in the federal litigation, but did not disclose the conflict to the
individual physicians who were the defendants in the Marguhes' malpractice action.
The individual physicians in the malpractice action sought to have J-W removed due to
conflict of interest. J-W, as Arnold does here, defended on the basis that their duties were to the
limited partnership and not the individual physicians. The issue was thereby clearly framed and
exactly the same as this case. The Supreme Court stated:
The lower court found that an attorney-client relationship was formed (with the
individual physicians) because the federal action, if successful, would directly aid and
benefit the physicians. We agree.
Jones, Waldo contends that a personal request for legal services or advice by the
client and an acceptance by the attorney is necessary for an attorney-client relationship to
be formed. We disagree. Id. at 1200. (emphasis added)
The Court reasoned that J-W's successful representation of the limited partnership in the
federal case would have protected the doctors from substantial personal liability. Therefore, it
was not at all unreasonable for the limited partners to believe that Jones, Waldo was acting for
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their individual interests as well as the interests of the partnership m that litigation The Court
specifically held,
When, however, the individual interests of the limited partners are directly
involved, as they are here, there may be sufficient grounds for implying the existence of
an attorney-client relationship Id. at 1201
The only differences between Mar guiles and this case is 1hat here the individual interests
of the Normans are abundantly more clear and pronounced, and the violations of professional
conduct and duty on the part of defendant Arnold are equally more stark and egregious
The Normans' individual interests in the joint venture were tremendous The whole idea
of the hotel project was that it would enhance the business, profitability and value of the
waterpark that the Normans solely owned and operated on immediately adjacent property As
among the members of the venture, the Normans also very clearly had the most risk at stake
The Young loan was secured by the Normans' property The property was never transferred by
the Normans to the joint venture

No one else involved in the project contributed anything

Foreclosure or failure would oe (and has been) a crushing blow to the Normans' personal
financial well-being and to their adjacent, existing business

Arnold's knowledge of the

Normans' personal interest in the project, his own belief that he represented those interests and
his personal assumption of a duty to protect them is best illustrated by his own testimony
Q
After having paid himself back for those franchise fees, why would there be any
question at all about (Larson) turning
(the franchise) over to the group
A
I think at that point in time Larson and Page weren't on the best of terms, and I
didn't know what was going to happen
Q
I know But so what7
A
It means a lot Simply because Norm Larson was the franchisee of record with
the Holiday Inn, had to be, he had to be the one And if I was going to save Bob Norman's
property and get some way to build the motel, I needed to have some ability to get the franchise
in someone else's hands so we could do it.
Q
I'm having trouble making any sense of that
weren't you relying on Norman
Larson to be the guy to get the money to build the thing7
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A.
Well, at this point in time, those guys - they had. been like a toi nato i ottii lg froi i i
the inside out. They were adversarial at this point in time.
Q.
What point in time is this?
A.
I can only generally tell you it was probably about the time that Diane Norman
cai •: in rn\ office and the meeting from which she's got a record of
o
That was May 1, 1996.
Yeah,, I'm not sure. But it seems to me at that point in time things were starting
to heat up. Because Norm was not at that meeting.
Q.
But Norm reimbursed himself for the franchise (with) the first check out of the
account in June of 1995. By May 1st of 1996, when Diane came up desperately seeking some
money, the account had all been spent. Every cent of it had been spent.
A.
Yeah. Hence the need to find somebody that could build the hotel and save the
Normans' property.
Q.
Why hadn't that been done before?
A.

/ don 't know. All I can say is that's w :l /i< // 1 person* ill) ; ti /e< / to lo.

(Arnold deposition at 104-05, R 515, Add. 4)(emphasis added)
Defendant \ i nold * \ as si u ely a ware tl lat it: ie otl lei pai tnei s had not and did not intend to
contribute anything to the venture. Greg Page, who was to handle financial matters for the joint
venture had delegated his role to defendant Larson for a 25% interest in the project in violation
of the joint venture agreement. Duane Barney was named as "administrate e agent" foi
venture. Under the joint venture agreement, Barney was to have control of the project funds and
ki»k accounts

Unknown lo !ht"

NOIIIMIIS

lianu'v had been p i r \ i o n s l \ r o n \ it led ol Intiul

approximately, October, 1995, Barney was sent back to prison
Arnold prepared and notarized a power of attorney

In

- M - violation. Mark

:iamo> -n rawu of Greg Page. (R 552-

54, Add. 4) The Normans were not informed, and of course, Arnold was well aware that he had
given the entire Young loan proceeds to his client Norman Larson in violation of the joint
venture agreement. Finally, Arnold himself nepolni led ,md prvpnml I k .ii'iirniiMit dici Hn In
personally acquired the interest in Pete Lanto who was to build the project. This resulted in the
legal dissolution of [\w Monh I and Dcselopmcnl limit VVtifiiii"1 and iiiucJibh. \mold acquired
Lanto's interest with proceeds of the Young loan in lieu of attorney's fees.
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Arnold was engaged in gross self dealing, beginning with the obscene loan fees and
points doled out to himself and his clients from the Young loan, then in providing the entire loan
proceeds to his client Larson, then in diverting joint venture funds to other projects (Park City)
and his own company (Venture Properties II), and finally in destroying the existing joint venture
and inserting himself and his client Larson as the leaders of whatever followed.
Arnold feebly asserts that he owed no duty to the Normans, and that all of his conduct
was approved by the non-participating scammers Greg Page and Duane Barney, thereby
eliminating any claim of breach of fiduciary duty to the joint venture. Any integrity in this
position is immediately eliminated when one understands that it is the plaintiffs' contention that
Page and Barney actively participated with defendants Arnold and Larson to take advantage of
and withhold critical information from the plaintiffs.

Arnold's unlikely and totally unsupported

(Barney and Page were not deposed, nor did they submit affidavits) position, at best, illustrates
the myriad material questions of fact left unresolved. And in any event, Arnold's position does
not overcome the Supreme Court's ruling in Margulies. There, it was established that the
attorneys had made appropriate disclosures to authorized members of the limited partnership.
The Supreme Court specifically ruled that where individual members of the partnership had
important individual interests at stake, disclosure to the partnership entity was not enough - it
had to be made directly to those individual partners. Margulies, supra, at 1203-04.
All of these factors lead inescapably to the conclusion that the Normans, who knew
Arnold was attorney for the venture, believed and understood that Arnold would also look after
their personal interests. In addition to the fact that the Normans' primary interest in the project
was to enhance the business and value of their adjacent waterpark, it is undisputed that the
Normans went directly to Arnold to:
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a>

secure extensions on tl ic "\ oui lg i lote;

b.

request that Arnold protect them from foreclosure by his clients;

c.

obtaii i a pai tial release of the n pi opei I:; ' i it idei tl lie I i i ist Deed to protect their

interest in water on the property and/or for a separate personal water bottling business;
d

obtain funds from the Young loan to pay for repairs after a fire at the waterpark;

e.

obtain a partial release of their property under the ' I r list Deed to i lse as collatei al

for another personal loan;

the City ofMoab;
g.

k'lovn inhi1 iV^MKKi Arnold and Lai son had sent to .Arizona (which Arnold

promised to do); and other matters. (Iranscript of 8-2-00 Hearing, R.1429 at 27-29, Add. 35, see
also, Affidavit of Robert Norman, f20, 21 ° 4, 29, R. 1167, Add. 26)
Thougl I

•

v

'^

- '•'

- ' *

-

• '

existed, Arnold essentially admitted a direct relationship with the Normans.
Q:
Did you take any par t n ilh list ussion nhtinl ilie dissolution of the
partnership set forth in (R.550, Add 4)?
A;
None. I always had it in the back of my mind that maybe the net effect of Mr.
Lanto doing what he did may destroy that partnership, but I didn't know hardly anything about
it I had no input at all.
Q:
Did you at an> time aftei Octobei 2 7, 1995, pei foi i: i I legal sei v ices for -A ,. on
call the group?
A:
I believe so.
Q:
So that group was not 4-D Development?
A:
I don't know what the group was. / viewed them as individuals,
Q:
That sort of contradicts your testimony
You said you didi i t represei it
individuals.
A:
The group as individuals.
Arnold deposition at 38-39, R.514, Add 4)
Finall> and directly related to the Supreme Court's decision in Marguhes was Arnold's
almost inconceivable web of conflicting interests that were not disclosed to the plaintiffs.
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Arnold entered the picture as attorney for the joint venture or group. Arnold was attorney for
Western Empire Advisors and Norman Larson who was brought in to obtain financing contrary
to the terms of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement. Arnold subsequently
gave his client Larson sole custody and control of the Young loan proceeds which was the only
asset of the venture other than the Normans' property. Arnold was attorney for Ann and Norman
Young who loaned the joint venture $160,000 secured by the plaintiffs' property. Arnold
"negotiated" outrageous terms for the loan for the direct personal benefit of himself and his
clients Norman Larson and the Youngs. Arnold was the attorney for 4-D Development that was
at once involved with and competing with the Moab venture.

4-D was simultaneously

attempting to put together a hotel development in Park City. Funds from the Young loan were
diverted to the Park City project with Arnold's knowledge and participation in contravention of
the Moab joint venture agreement. Arnold subsequently purchased an interest in the joint
venture and indemnified the outgoing partner against losses, specifically including the Young
loan and tort claims. Incredibly, this transaction put Arnold in a position of conflict with
himself. In drafting this Purchase Agreement, Arnold was the architect of the transaction that
destroyed whatever may have been left of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture.
Nevertheless, Arnold thereafter held himself out publicly as the attorney for and a partner of the
joint venture that continued to try to develop the hotel projects, and was therein obviously and
primarily motivated by his personal interests.
This intricate web of conflicting interests went undisclosed to the Normans despite
Arnold's knowledge of the Normans' extensive personal interests in the Moab project, and the
fact that they alone bore the most immediate, direct and personal risk in the project.
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These multiple conflicts not only underscore Arnold's complete disregard of his fiduciary
duties, they stand in
Margulies case that prompted the Supreme Court's ruling that the attorneys there owed a duty to
• iirecth infoi n 1 tt le indi1 icit lal physicians of the coi lflict ait id potei itial for harm arising therefrom.
Interestingly, this Court's decision in Margulies was the focus of a law review article, J "he
Implications

of Fiduciary Relationships

in Representing . . . Unincorporated Associations

Their Partners or Members, 25 Stetson L. Rev W) i 1 W S |

and

| hv iirtirk focuses on I In; iliilns i Il

an attorney in a position such as Arnold here, and highlights Arnold's absolute fiduciary failure
in this case.
The Margulies decision is further supported by Breuer-Harnson
(Utah L'l App

l^'Oi

v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716

Thai case im-« -^ . * complex real estate transaction in which the

defendant Combe filed a cross claim against attorney Froerer for legal negligence,

flic cross

claim was dismissed on summary judgment by the trial court on the ground that Froerer did not
IiitYlh i'/present Comlv

' ' h r ' V n 1 ' "I A\\\K\\\

" i n n s a l -iiul ", iliii^ \Urxuiws

cmpdsiA'.l Ilia1

an attorney-client relationship may be implied b> the conduct of the parties, and that the
i: elationship n lay be pi o \ ed ": "by showing that the party seeks and receives the ad.vi.ee of the
lawyer in matters pertinent to the lawyer's profession." Id. at 727.

The Normans did so, many

times. Most important as pertaining to this appeal, the Court of Appeals held,
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Combes, we cannot say thai
there is no genuine issue of material fact entitling Froerer to summary judgment. It is
only necessary for the nonmoving party to show "facts" controverting the "facts"
asserted by the moving party. We therefore reverse and remand on the factual issue of
whether an attorney client relationship existed . .
Id. at 728-29 (emphasis added)
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In this case, the trial court never got to the "facts." Instead, the trial court ignored the
"facts" and treated the issue purely as a matter of law. As demonstrated above, there is an
abundance of facts from which a jury could find both the existence of a fiduciary duty running
from defendant Arnold to the plaintiffs, and the breach of that duty.
The circumstances of this case, in light of the Margulies decision, mandate reversal of the
summary judgment granted defendant Arnold on plaintiffs' claim of breach of fiduciary duty.
The reversal of summary judgment on this issue would also mandate reinstatement of plaintiffs'
punitive damage claim against Arnold since it was dismissed solely upon the dismissal of the
fiduciary duty claim. (Transcript of 8-2-00 Hearing, R. 1429 at 53, Add. 35)
Point II: The Trial Court Erred in Granting Defendants' Summary Judgment
On Plaintiffs5 Claim For Violations of the Joint Venture Agreement
As the basis for the Order granting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
plaintiffs' claim that defendants Arnold and Larson had breached the joint venture agreement,
The Court. . . finds that the plaintiffs' first cause of action, for alleged breach of a joint
venture agreement, fails as to defendant Arnold and defendant Larson for the reason that
neither Arnold not Larson were at any time members of the joint venture and thus owed no
duties to other members of that joint venture for any alleged breach of the joint venture
agreement. (Order filed January 18,2001, R.1415, Add. 34)
This finding was directly contrary to a mountain of evidence, the conduct and express
statements of the defendants, and the understanding of the plaintiffs. The ruling was based solely
on the fact that the plaintiffs never expressly consented to the participation of Arnold and Larson
in the joint venture. The simple reason for the lack of express consent was in evidence before
the Court - No one ever asked them. (Deposition of Robert Norman (8/25/99) at 28, R. 1429 at
17) And indeed, prior to terminating the plaintiffs' claim on summary judgment, the trial court
had previously ruled that a jury could consider both the conduct of the defendants, and plaintiffs'
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apparent acquiescence in defendants' participation in the joint venture in determin ..
the defendants breached the joint venture agreement.
1 think there . . . notwithstanding
the Norman's statements that they never
consented, I think there is a factual question as to whether, in fact, that conduct that
followed Mr. Arnold purchasing the equity interest, and that being communicated to the
Normans, in fact, did constitute consent. And I think I can give a fairly
understandable
instruction to the jury that, before they even consider the breach of contract
question,
they have to consider whether consent was given
But notwithstanding their testimony that they never consented, if they understood
that question as meaning, did I ever verbally consent, I think the jury could still find,
from the evidence that I've heard, that, in fact, they did agree with it, by knowing of it
and not objecting to it (Transcript of 8-28-00 Hearing at 44-45, R 1432, Add. 36)
In their Complaint, the plaintiffs stated that the defendants had breached the Moab Land

time, one of the few they had been provided prior to the litigation. It was a name for the venture.
Plaintiffs continuously implored the trial court not to

^

+~ ^ e confines ^

agreement; that, in reality, the MLDJV never existed in practice. Defendants

+u^

^ a

out of one section in the MLDJV Agreement that provided that no new partners could join the

repeatedly to the Court, the defendants and other partners in the joint venture completely ignored
virtual I \

CWT>

other provision ol the MLDJV Agreement

(See, e.g., arguments in initial

hearing before the trial court on 8-2-00, R. 1429 at 13-18; Add. 35, Affidavit of Robert Norman,
R I Ih7-81, Add. 26)
Utah law defines a joint venture quite simpl) as xan < i ssc < :u it io? i * r/: l"| M; ":» » » " }re / Person s
to carry on as co-owners

of a single business enterprise"

U.C.A. §48-1

cmnis question bull (luiil i |<nnt unitim n i \r»(ol loi llir purpose til ik"u*lo[
in Moab owned by the plaintiffs.

!

hen can be no
i

=

a property

It is equally apparent that these defendants were active,
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participating members in the venture. Arnold and Larson conducted the business of the joint
venture virtually alone. The defendants had complete control and authority over the venture's
liquid assets. Norman Larson owned the requisite Holiday Inn Franchise personally. He had
entered a Service Agreement giving him a 25% interest in the project. After Arnold and Larson
had sent $50,000 to a lending source in Arizona and it appeared that a capital infusion of over $3
million was imminent, Arnold and Larson very deliberately formalized their participation by
buying in to the venture. They thereafter publicly proclaimed to anyone interested that they were
partners and equity owners in the project. (R.551, 555, Add. 4)
In the context of this undisputed scenario, summary judgment on the basis that the
defendants never became partners is unsupportable. This is particularly so after the Lanto
Purchase Agreement on October 27, 1995. The trial court recognized that the Lanto buy-out by
Arnold would have the effect of dissolving whatever was left of the Moab Land Development
Joint Venture. (Transcript of 8-2-00 Hearing at 44, R.1429, Add. 35) So, for that matter, did
Arnold. (Arnold deposition at 38-39, R.514, Add. 4) It is beyond question that a joint venture
existed thereafter with the same purpose and that Arnold and Larson were partners.
It was and is plaintiffs' contention that, having previously been in complete control of the
assets and business of the venture, and having purposefully become partners by buying out Lanto
right at the time when it appeared the financing effort might be successful, the defendants should
be estopped from denying their participation as partners in a joint venture with the plaintiffs.
Moreover, since the defendants were probably the only persons fully aware of the events and
transactions concerning the joint venture prior to the Lanto buyout and dissolution of the
MLDJV, the defendants should be held accountable for their conduct during that period.
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Before equitable estoppel may be applied, three elements must be present:
1.

an, admission, state! i lei it oi act ii icoi isistei it \^i; - it! i til ne claii n after wards asserted;

2.

action by the other party on the basis o f such admission, statement or act; and

3.

Injury to such party resulting from allowing
repudiate such admission, statement or act.

Breiter-Harrison

v. Combe,

rartv to contradict or

799 P.2d 716, "726 (Utah App. 1990). In this case, the defendants

purposefully bought in to the joint venture a n d i epresented tl lemselves as par I:i lers, bi it take t! le
position in this litigation that they cannot be held liable as partners as a matter ot ia^
defendants as i i lei nbei s of tl ite joint '• si iti 11 € , 01 as p: 1 ofessionals *voi k

-

• *
», •* .

venture, intentionally violated the provisions o f the |oin< venture agreement and ultimately,
directly caused its dissolution

[ h e y nevertheless publicly continued to act as members and

representatives o f a joint venture including the plaintiffs thereafter.

I h e plaintiffs were aware of

and acquiesced to the defendants' activities on behalf o f the venture, and n o w are in the position

the defendants are allowed to escape liability for their conduct.
Should II11 s I omul inverse the trial court's ruling on this issue, it is important that it also
reverse the trial court's rulings on the defendant Arnold's motions in limine.

(R. 1139, Add. 2 2 ,

Transcript of 8-28-00 Hearing, R.1432, Add. 3 6 ) E v e n though the trial court initially denied
Arnold's motion for summary judgmei it 01 1 this issue. it * v as these 1 i llings that effectiv el>
eliminated plaintiffs' evidence to prove defendants breached the joint venture, and set the stage
101 l l i r iiilfiiiiTiiU i l i ' . r m v n i i iint llie ( I iiiiiii

11 ih i I ni
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HIII

11)

Point III: The Defendants Should Be Held Responsible For a Proportionate
Share of the Liability Under the Young Trust Deed Note
As the basis for the its Order granting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
plaintiffs' claim that defendants Arnold and Larson should be held proportionately responsible
for the losses incurred by the plaintiffs under the Young Trust Deed Note,
The Court. . .finds that the second cause of action, for alleged default of a trust
deed note, fails as to defendant Arnold because he was not at any time an obligor on the
trust deed note and thus owed no duty with respect to any alleged default of the note; and
fails as to defendant Larson because, while he was an obligor on the trust deed note, any
duty he undertook with respect to that note ran only to persons who are not parties herein,
and he had no duty to the plaintiffs with respect to that note. (Order filed January 18, 2001,
R. 1415, Add. 34)
The Note was an Exhibit to plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 1 at R.26-27, Add. 1), and was signed by the
Normans, Greg Page, Duane Barney, Peter Lanto and defendant Norman Larson.
Here again, the Court's eventual grant of summary judgment on this issue is directly
contrary to its previous rulings, and also contrary to defendants' admission that contested issues
of fact precluded summary judgment. The trial court had previously held,
Well, certainly the Normans could have sued Lanto and stepped into his shoes
and ultimately acquired Lanto ys right to seek indemnification, right?
Well let me tell you what I think about that, because Vm pretty clear on that I
don't think anybody's going to change my mind with argument, maybe with a case, but not
with argument. If people jointly sign a promissory note, as far as the person in whose favor
the note runs, any one of them is responsible. But as between the makers, each of them is
equally responsible. .. unless otherwise indicated.. . if there's seven signers, each of them
is obligated to pay l/7th... Contribution
Let me tell you where I think Vd rule, if I were deciding, and where I think the
jury would be instructed to go. That is, even though [the note] wasn 't ever formally
foreclosed and declared in default, if it ended up being paid, in effect, by deducting it from
the proceeds of the sale, then it is paid, and they have the right to contribution from other
makers of the promissory note.
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If the Normans ultimately are able to convince a jury that Larson or Arnold wo.'
obligated under the promissory note, or obligated as partners, and should share in what the
Normans had to pay, the Normans can recover an appropriate share of what the Normans
had to pay from these other partners or other makers of the promissory note, which would
include the interest that the Normans had to pay. (Transcript of 8-28-00 Hearing; R 1432 at
58-61, Add. 36)

Coi nisei for defendai it \ it i iold stated at a preti ial I: ieai ing,
I he 2n< i cause of action concerns the liability of several co-obligors on a
promissory note
and that is a claim for which we have not moved for summary judgment
and we acknowledge that that should go forward to trial {Id. at 4. 6>
And the Lanto interest, I admit that is an issue of fact for the jury, whether Mark
Arnold purchased Lanto's interest... but that's cause of action number two
{Id. at 37)
I his issue is, more than anything, one of common sense I he trial court's ultimate ruling
on December 15, 2000, in an effort to package the entire case for appeal defies common sense.
The trial court justified its ruling through the use of an analogy whereby a father is requested by
I k i n k In i o MUJl nil I »i 11 III III tin III

(HI.

And just like the situation where I may act as a guarantor or a cosigner o/. </ n* */•
for my son who wants to buy a car, there's no viable legal theory uw *;.•;»/ to awu hack
and sue me, when he doesn 7 make the payments and the car ends up getting foreclosed
or repossessed. So I'm granting Norman Larson's motion for summary judgment on that
cause of action. (Transcript of 12-15-00 Hearing at 68, R.1431, Add. 38)
The trial court's reasoning fails in several respects. First, the asset (a car) was solely for
the son - dad has no interest in it. Second, even though the son would ne * er si te his father foi
his own failures, if the repossessed car was insufficient to cover the outstanding debt (which is
hkelvi lilt

hank i c i t i i i i l

(

i n u l d Jiiiili 'mi HI Ml In 4 |
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Norman's derived no direct benefit for the Young loan. On the other hand, Norman Larson was
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given complete control of the loan proceeds and personally benefited to the tune of
approximately $71,500.* Plus, Larson stood to acquire a 25% interest in the Moab project if his
efforts to acquire financing with the loan fees were successful. Most important, the son who has
the car repossessed for failure to make payments has not lost anything. In this case, the Normans
lost $212,000 and the right to control very valuable property adjacent to their existing business.
(*Larson took $40,000 as reimbursement for the Holiday Inn Franchise, but kept the
franchise in his own name; he received $8,000 in cash as "loan fees"; he received the $10,000
check made out to Venture Properties II on the returned earnest money for the Park City property
but never accounted for it; he paid $8,500 from the loan fees under the Pete Lanto Purchase
Agreement; and he repaid the $5,000 advanced from Greg Page under the Service Agreement
with 4-D Development from the loan fees.)
Norman Larson signed the trust deed note. It does not matter why, or what induced him
to do so, which, in any event are factual issues. The Court, based solely on statements of the
defendants, assumed that Larson was induced to sign as a guarntor, not that there is any practical
difference between a guarantor and co-obligor. In fact, the evidence from defendants in this case
was that, had Arnold's clients the Youngs come looking for payment on the note, they would
have gone after defendant Larson first.
Larson is without question a co-obligor on the note.

Arnold directly and specifically

assumed the liability of another co-obligor, Pete Lanto. The plaintiffs, having effectively paid
the note in full, are entitled to contribution from the co-obligors as a matter of law and equity.
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IV.

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs9
Claim For Punitive Damages

Plaintiffs'orijjnui •>•.»*. i

* « : *v * •

both Arnold and Larson for punitive damages. After plaintiffs amended their complaint to add
the cl.'iuti

IMI h i v < u h n l

fuiiHun Jul1
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\rn<»ld inuved for summary judgment on

Counts I, III (new claim for breach of fiduciary duty) and IV. The Court granted defendant's
motion on the fiduciary duty claim, and dismissed the punitive damage claim solely on the
finding that plaintiffs' remaining causes ml at lion soiindo) HI i uniim t .tini nol tin I
Trial Court: (Count) Four topples because three topples,
Russell:
1 need a clarification on why Jour topples because ojthree. • *
damage claim was in initially before the fiduciary duty claim ever existed.

. . -u> punitive

Trial Court: (T)he remaining claims are both breach of contract now., and you don't get
punitive damages for breach of contract
Russell:

. . . / don't think our claims are limited to breach of contract claims, i W)e < ire

alleging intentional, purposeful deception

, diverting funds. . . basically theft.

(Transcript c >f 8-2-00 I fearing at 53-55. R 1429,, A,dd 35)
More specifically, in their statement of facts, plaintiffs claimed they were deceived h> tin
defendants including Arnold into pledging their property for a $40,000 '
and that the

R 1, Add 1); plaintiffs claimed Arnold had wrongfully diverted $16,000 from the loan fees (IJ
K24); pLi 111 • I * rliimiul 1 iii .on lia.f |.,n I lmiisi II V i n n u o \ , ll, l ( , i L l a \ l..n l i a n t h i s e lee but
kept the franchise in his owe name (Id. *|25); plaintiffs claimed the defendants made other
unwarranted expenditures for their personal benefit
definitely tortious in nature.
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(Id. |29, 33)

These allegations are

Plaintiffs' first cause of action is for ''Breach of Joint Venture Agreement." Nowhere is
the claim characterized or limited to a breach of contract claim. And indeed, in their third cause
of action for punitive damages,
55.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally set out to take
advantage of them and use their property to secure funds which defendants would then
use for their own purposes.
56.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose
defendant Barney's status as a convicted felon involving other business scams, as well as
the involvement of defendant Larson who was expected to drain off the money secured
by plaintiffs' property for purposes unrelated to the development of plaintiffs' property.
57.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew and intended that money obtained against
plaintiffs' property would be used for purposes other than to develop, manage and
maintain that property.
58.
Plaintiffs allege that in the course of conduct set forth above, that defendants
knowingly and intentionally lied to them and misrepresented themselves, their conduct
and their intentions, thereby causing plaintiffs to suffer economic losses . . . (Complaint,
R.l,Add.l)
These allegations remained completely intact in plaintiffs' first amended complaint.
(R.216, Add. 2). A "tort" is defined simply as, "a breach of duty, other than a breach of contract,
for which the offender will be subject to legal responsibility." Webster' Deluxe Edition (1989).
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that in some cases an act constituting a breach of
contract may also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract and give rise to
causes of action in tort. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 n.3 (Utah
1985). In Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1991), the Court affirmed
that tort liability is not always precluded just because there is a contract between the plaintiff and
defendant. In some cases, an act or omission resulting in breach of contract may also constitute
breach of a duty that is not subsumed by the contract and may thereby give rise to a cause of
action sounding in tort.
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The law of partnership and joint venture expressly recognize
agents for each other. This enhances their fiduciary relationship. Hal Taylor Associates
America Ins., 657 P 2d 743, 7 1 8 (I Jfc it 1:982)

v. Union

« lai ge poi tion : f tl it • it t liscoi : .di ic t it ti ibi itable tc

defendant Arnold was his failure, intentional or otherwise, to inform the Normans of information
nitiuil In liie |oml vemuie. U.C.A

y i l v l I <"' fnoudes thai, '(Joint v enturers) shall render on.

demand true and full information of all things affecting the joint venture ..."

The breach of this

duty is a tort that could, under appropriate circumstances, form the basis for plaintiffs' punitive
damage claim.
While *K u-f:

r

. r \ implied contract between the Normans and defendants are
trv into the joint

venture

would fall outside the terms of any such contract. The same can be said about the Arnold Larson formation of V enture Properties II, I X , and the use of joint venture funds for purposes
other than the Moab Holiday Inn. These acts (conversion, theft,, misrepresentation). fall.!.! ig
outside the scope of any contractual relationship that may have existed between the parties, are
torts.
In DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm. Co.y 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), plaintiff suffered losses in a
: obbei > ai ter defendant had installed an alarm system and entered into a service and maintenance
contract.

Ihe evidence established that the alarm system had been circumvented in a mannei

that was known to the defendant and that could have been remedied by a simple and inexpensive
alteration to the system. However, defendant failed to inform plaintiff *>< ihe pntcniul p i n N m
and remed)

The Court recognized that a party who breaches his duty of care toward another

iiii.H he ftiiiihl luhli; IN Inrl i n n "kiln in tin irltilionship giving us* In sin In »i dul\ originates in a
contract between the parties (Id. at 434-35), and went on to hold that,
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[T]he defendant's duty to warn the plaintiff of the vulnerability of the alarm
system did not come from any provision contained within the four corners of the contract.
Instead, the duty as it exists in this case is derived from defendant's general duty of due
care which accompanies its ongoing relationship with plaintiff for service and
maintenance of the alarm system. Thus, the plaintiff' allegation of failure to warn
provides the basis for a cause of action in tort which is entirely separate from any contract
based claim which plaintiff might present. Id. at 436.
Perhaps most telling are the terms of the Lanto Purchase Agreement drafted by
defendant-attorney Arnold on October 27, 2000. (Exhibit 1 to Amended Complaint at R.231,
Add. 2) There, whether as hired professionals working on behalf of the joint venture and/or as a
member of the joint venture, Arnold specifically indemnified Lanto against tort claims. Lanto
knew that Arnold and Larson were engaged in tortious conduct and demanded protection
accordingly.
Interestingly, defendant Larson never requested that the Court dismiss the punitive
damage claim against him, nor did the

art ever formally do so. Nevertheless, the same

arguments made above apply equally to Larson.
V:

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Not
Allowing the Plaintiffs to Amend Their Complaint

Rule 15(a), U.R.Civ.P.f provides in relevant part that "a party may amend his pleadings
only by leave of Court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall befreelygiven
when justice so requires." (emphasis added) In this case, the defendants had intentionally
deceived and withheld information from the plaintiffs until after the case was filed. After initial
discovery, when the nature and extent of defendant Arnold's conduct as an attorney became
known, the Court granted the plaintiffs' leave to file an amended Complaint to add a cause of
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laim was

subsequently dismissed Arnold's motion for summary judgment,,, (R 779,,, Axid 7)
[ hj heanng on this motion took -r i.** , -

ciobci

> A -\ud o) The case

thereafter went to trial on August 28, 2000. After a jury was seated, there was a bizarre mistiial
caused by a juror's disclosure that he had failed to mention a prior felony conviction. Trial was

Vdd 12) Thereafter, the Court heard argument on various Motions in Limine that had been filed
by tl ie plaii itiffs and defendant

.

he extent the ti ial court's rulings could, be

understood, they seemed to prohibit plaintiffs from introducing any of the abundant evidence
they had to support their remaining causes of action

(Transcript of 8-28-00 Hearing, R.1432,

Add. 22 andR. 1145, Add 2*)
plaint iffs imi nediately si . *

,;.,'*•

amended complaint (R.971, Add. 13 j, and for leave to further amend. * R. * *, i KJ, Add. * 6 f 1 hc^c
motions came before the Court on October 10. Jooo and were denied It was at this point that
the trial court apparently decided that * --.r-. •* •--. • > -.

-

•-• * defendants si immar y judgmei it

on all of the plaintiffs' claims so the case would only have to be appealed once. (Minutes of 10
i;
Transcript ol 10-10-00 Hearing, R.1430, Add. 37) The sole basis for the denial of plaintiffs'
motion to iiinciid was iliai m bad 101111' too Ian: • 11 it I would prejudice the defendants. Though a
trial court has liberal discretion in this regard, plaintiffs' motion was only necessary due to the
trial court's very late and ambiguous rulings, and it was pointed out that plaintiffs' proposed
iiiniKJineiils would mil 1 hiinut1 tin v\ nknvv one iota 01 irqum air1', .nlditiniml
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The extreme prejudice caused by the trial court's refusal to allow plaintiffs to amend their
complaint is best illustrated by the following colloquy on October 10, 2000, when the Court
denied plaintiffs' motion to amend:
Russell:
(A)ll I want to do is be able to present the facts to a jury and let them (decide). .
Nothing has been added to the case. We've been chipping away at the case to the point where . .
it's no longer our case. I don't recognize what it is, what our case is anymore.
Trial Court: And it's not viable. It's not viable the way it is, right? I mean . . . Mr. Lalli says
you can still go to trial on these two claims, but you really don't have much hope ofprevailing
on those, the way I've limited you on those, right?
Russell:

Right.

(Transcript of 10-10-00 Hearing at 44, R. 1430, Add. 37)

The Court: So if I don't grant your motion to amend, we're going to be wasting our time
having a trial?
(Id. at 47)
(emphasis added)
Following the 10-10-00 hearing, all parties filed motions for summary judgment on the
remaining claims as requested, and the trial court, despite ample evidence supporting plaintiffs'
claims, most material facts either in dispute or established in plaintiffs' favor, and legitimate
questions of law that had been incorporated into the trial court's prior rulings - granted
defendants' motions dismissing plaintiffs' remaining claims. (Minutes of 12-15-00 argument
and ruling, R.1404, Add. 32; Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, R.1415, Add. 34;
Transcript of 12-15-00 Hearing, R.1431, Add. 38)
The trial court's final judgment dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint is little more than an
exercise in expedience. Though the trial court has ample discretion, the failure to allow plaintiffs
an opportunity to amend their complaint in the face of defendants' intentional withholding and
failure to disclose pertinent information, and the Court's rulings made after the initial trial date
that rendered plaintiffs unable to introduce necessary evidence should be ruled an abuse of
discretion.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' case should have gone to trial. Defendants, as agents for and members of the
joint venture, disregarded and violated the provisions of a written joint venture agreement and
eventually caused its destruction. They nevertheless carried on as members and agents of a
continuing joint venture that included the plaintiffs. The defendants are liable to the plaintiffs for
contribution of their share of liability under the trust deed note. Larson is a co-obligor. Arnold
directly assumed liability. Plaintiffs' claim against Arnold for breach of fiduciary duty as an
attorney is viable under this Court's decision in Marguhes v. Upchurch. This cause of action
alone supports plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages against Arnold. Plaintiffs' original claim
for punitive damages against both Arnold and Larson was supported by claims of breach of
fiduciary duty both as agents for and members of the joint venture, and for other tortious conduct
that was clearly set forth in plaintiffs' Complaint.
Provided ample evidence of defendants' intentional misconduct, misrepresentations and
non-disclosure, the trial court should have estopped defendants from denying their participation
in the joint venture, their professional relationships with the plaintiffs, and their liability under
the trust deed note. For the same reasons, aggravated by inconsistent and contradictory rulings,
the trial court should have exercised its discretion to liberally allow amendments to plaintiffs'
pleadings.
Plaintiffs' respectfully request that the several rulings granting defendants summary
judgment on plaintiffs' claims be reversed, and the case remanded for trial on all issues.
Plaintiffs further request an award of their costs incurred in connection with this appeal.
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